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Abstract
Mortgage prepayments play a crucial role in the pricing and hedging of
mortgage backed securities. An important feature of mortgage prepayment
modeling is burnout; as time goes on those borrowers who have the greatest
tendency to refinance are removed from the pool leaving only those that are less
likely to refinance. In this paper we examine the implications of burnout on the
late time prepayment rate using rather general assumptions. Analytic formulas
are derived for the average prepayment rate in the N ’th month, PSMM
N
, and
the fraction of borrowers remaining in the pool in the N ’th month, yN . In the
case where the incentive to refinance, and other relevant economic factors, are
constant these results are particularly simple. For example, PSMM
N
= p(0)+(1−
p(0))/N + ..., where p(0) is a constant and the ellipses denote terms suppressed
by more powers of 1/N or exponentially suppressed. The term of order 1/N
indicates that burnout causes the probability of prepayment to decrease as a
very simple function of N .
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The pricing and price volatility of mortgage backed securities depend critically
on the mortgage prepayment rate (Fabozzi [1992]). Prepayment models have several
components, of which the two most important are refinancing and turnover. The
refinancing component of a prepayment model captures prepayments due to the in-
centive provided by lower mortgage rates in the market than the mortgage holder’s
own mortgage. The turnover component captures prepayments due to mortgagor
mobility, home sales etc. An important aspect of the refinancing component is that
mortgage holders in the pool have different propensity to refinance. As time goes
on those with the greatest tendency to refinance are removed from the pool leaving
only those less likely to refinance. This phenomena is usually called burnout (Hayre
[1994]). In this paper we examine the implications of burnout for the prepayment rate
at late times. Assuming that the refinancing probability and the initial distribution
of borrowers are smooth functions of the borrowers propensity to refinance, we derive
formulas for the average single monthly mortality in the N ’th month, P SMMN , and
the fraction of borrowers left in the pool after the N ’th month, yN (i.e. the survival
factor). In the case that the incentive to prepay, and other relevant economic factors,
are constant with time these results are very simple; P SMM
N
= p(0)+(1−p(0))/N , and
yN = yN0(N0/N)(1− p
(0))(N−N0), where p(0) is a constant. (Here N , N0 and N −N0
are assumed large and terms less important for large values of these quantities are
neglected.) The term of order 1/N in P SMM
N
reflects the fact that burnout causes the
prepayment rate to decrease with N and it gives rise to the factor of N0/N in the ex-
pression for yN . We compare our prediction for P
SMM
N with the results of simulations
based on the PIMCO prepayment model and find good agreement when N is large.
Suppose the pool of mortgage holders is distributed in a parameter θ that char-
acterizes their propensity to refinance. The (normalized) distribution of mortgage
holders in the pool at the end of month n is denoted by fn(θ), and the initial dis-
tribution of mortgage holders in the pool is denoted by f0(θ). The integral of fn(θ)
over allowed values of θ is unity. Let pr(n; θ) be the probability of refinancing, at a
given θ, in month n. It depends on various factors of which the most important is the
incentive to refinance. The incentive to refinance is variously modeled by different
groups to be a function of the difference, or the ratio of the mortgage coupon and
the current mortgage rate. The probability of prepaying in month n due to other
effects like turnover and defaults is denoted by po(n). At a given value of θ, the total
probability of prepaying in the n’th month is p(n; θ) = pr(n; θ) + po(n).
Without loss of generality we assume that f0(θ) = 1 with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. If this isn’t
true just choose a new parameter θ′ to label the propensity to refinance such that
dθ′ = f(θ)dθ. In terms of this variable the probability of prepaying in month n is
p(n; θ′) = p(n; θ(θ′)). The choice f0(θ) = 1 has the disadvantage that it makes the
probability to prepay dependent on the initial distribution of borrowers in propensity
to refinance, but it is convenient for our purposes. Then the distribution of borrowers
after month n is (Hayre, Chaudhary and Young [2000]),
fn(θ) = An(1− p(n; θ)) . . . (1− p(1; θ)) , (1)
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where the normalization constant An is determined from the condition that the in-
tegral of fn(θ) over θ is unity. By assuming that fn satisfies eq. (1) we have put
the media effect into the value of p(n; θ) (rather than in the evolution of fn(θ)) and
neglected changes in fn(θ) arising from the evolution of borrower credit and financial
circumstances.
Suppose larger values of θ correspond to a greater propensity to refinance. Then
if the incentive to refinance is significant p(n; θ) is an increasing function of θ and
eq. (1) implies that the distribution of borrowers becomes peaked near θ = 0 for
late times. Since at late times it is the small θ region that is relevant we expand the
probability of prepaying in a power series about θ = 0,
p(n; θ) = p(0)(n) + p(1)(n)θ + . . . , (2)
where the ellipses denote terms with higher powers of θ. Clearly eq. (2) relies on
the assumption that the probability p(n; θ) is smooth in θ so that it can be expanded
in a power series. The first term in eq. (2) is the prepayment probability at θ = 0,
p(0)(n) = pr(n; 0) + po(n), and the coefficient of θ in the second term is the first
derivative of the refinancing probability with respect to θ evaluated at θ = 0, p(1)(n) =
dpr(n; 0)/dθ. Combining eq. (1) and the terms explictly shown in eq. (2) and using
(1− p(n; θ)) = (1− p(0)(n)) exp
[
−
p(1)(n)θ
1− p(0)(n)
+ . . .
]
, (3)
gives that, for large N , the distribution of borrowers after month N is,
fN(θ) = NδN exp[−NδNθ] , (4)
where
δN =
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
p(1)(n)
1− p(0)(n)
]
. (5)
Here we have assumed that p(1)(n) 6= 0. If p(1)(n) is zero or anomalously small then
terms we have considered as subdominant for large N are actually important.
Since δN is the average of N terms it is reasonable to assume (provided the re-
financing incentive remains significant for most of the time) that δN is order unity
( i .e. is not small for large N). Then eq. (4) indicates that as time evolves from
the origination of the mortgage to month N the distribution of mortgage holders,
in propensity to refinance, goes from flat (by convention) to strongly exponentially
peaked near θ = 0. Note that eq. (4) is valid only for large N and terms suppressed by
powers of 1/N or exp[−N ] have been neglected. It is not likely that for early months
the first two terms in the power series expansion of the prepayment rate about θ = 0
are the dominant ones. However, for large N , these are a negligible part of the sum
in eq. (5).
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The average prepayment rate in the n’th month is (Hayre, Chaudhary and Young
[2000])
P SMMn =
∫ 1
0
p(n; θ)fn−1(θ)dθ . (6)
Using the expression for fN in eq. (4), and eq. (2), the average single month mortality
at late times is given by,
P SMMN = p
(0)(N) +
p(1)(N)
NδN−1
+ . . . , (7)
where the ellipses represent terms suppressed by more powers of 1/N or exponentially
suppressed. Thus burnout causes the prepayment rate to evolve towards p(0)(N),
differing from it, by the term of order 1/N shown in eq. (7). In the case where
p(0)(n) = p(0) and p(1)(n) = p(1) are constants independent of time the average pre-
payment rate in the N ’th month becomes,
P SMMN = p
(0) +
1− p(0)
N
+ . . . . (8)
All dependence on the first derivative of the prepayment probability with respect to
θ, p(1), has disappeared. The prepayment rate P SMM
N
approaches p(0) in a universal
fashion independent of the details of the initial distribution of borrowers and the θ
dependence of the probability to prepay.
Prepayment rates are of often quoted on a yearly basis. Using the relation 1 −
PCPR
N
= (1 − P SMM
N
)12, between the constant prepayment rate PCPR
N
and the single
monthly mortality, eq. (8) implies that
PCPR
N
= 1− (1− p(0))12 +
12(1− p(0))12
N
+ . . . . (9)
Eqs. (8) and (9) are the main results of this paper.
It is interesting to compare eq. (8) with what would be obtained using the con-
tinuous time approximation. Then eq. (1) becomes,
fN (θ) = AN exp
[
−
∫
N
0
p(n; θ) dn
]
. (10)
This gives a coefficient of the order 1/N term in eq. (8) of 1 instead of 1 − p(0).
The p(0) in the order 1/N term is arises from the fact that the payments are made
discretely and not continuously.
The validity of eq. (8) or eq. (9) does not require the prepayment probability
to be independent of time for all time. Only the late time behavior is important in
the derivation of these results. These simple formulas may provide a useful“rule of
thumb” for estimating the importance of burnout on the late time prepayment rate.
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The value of N at which eq. (9) becomes an accurate approximation can be
ascertained by comparing this equation with the results of a realistic prepayment
model. In Figure 1 we compare this equation with the results of a simulation based
on the PIMCO prepayment model for generic Fannie Mae 30-year mortgages with
low seasoning. The effects of turnover were shut off and the incentive to refinance
was a constant 200 bp, to emphasize long time burnout behavior. The darker line is
eq. (9) with the value p(0) = 0.00958 fitted to the large N part of the simulation. We
see that eq. (9) fits very well after N = 100. Fits of similar quality hold for other
values of the incentive to refinance and if turnover is included.
Our results depend crucially on the assumption that the mortgage holders are
smoothly distributed in the continuous variable θ. Suppose that θ could only take on
a few discrete values, θk, k = 1, 2, . . . , kmax, and the propensity to refinance increases
with k. Let the initial fraction of borrowers corresponding to θk be fk and let p(θk)
denote their prepayment probability. In this case the analog of eq. (8) for the late
time behavior of the prepayment rate is (Hayre [1994])
P SMMN = p(θ1) + (p(θ2)− p(θ1))
f2
f1
[
1− p(θ2)
1− p(θ1)
]N−1
+ . . . . (11)
Now burnout causes the prepayment rate to approach p(θ1) exponentially fast. Fur-
thermore, the approach is not universal depending on f2/f1 and p(θ2)− p(θ1).
With a large pool of mortgage holders it is likely that treating θ as a continuous
variable is appropriate. Even with θ continuous it is possible that the refinance
probability is not analytic in θ. This would occur, for example, if a finite fraction of
the pool had zero probability to prepay even if the incentive to prepay was significant.
Empirically, mortgage holders that never prepay are rare and it seems reasonable that
in a statistical sense they can be treated as a set of measure zero.
The fraction of mortgage holders remaining in the pool after the n’th month is
yn = (1− P
SMM
n ) . . . (1− P
SMM
1 ) . (12)
Using eq. (8) for the single month mortality eq. (12) gives,
yN = yN0(N0/N)(1− p
(0))(N−N0) , (13)
where it is assumed that, N , N0 and N − N0 are all large. The factor of N0/N
is a consequence of burnout. Since the single month mortality and the fraction of
borrowers left in the pool both depend on the month N , we can eliminate N and
express the single month mortality as a function of the fraction remaining in the
pool, P SMM(y). For small y eq. (8) and eq. (13) imply that,
P SMM(y) = p(0) +
(1− p(0)) ln(1− p(0))
ln y
+ ... , (14)
4
where the ellipses denote terms less important as y goes to zero. Even though the
refinancing probability was assumed to be an analytic function of the propensity
to refinance the average prepayment rate is not analytic as a function of y. It’s
derivatives are singular at y = 0. We do not expect the term explicitly displayed
in eq. (14) to be an accurate approximation unless y is very small, since neglecting
the ellipses treats − ln y as much larger than ln(− ln y). Also, keeping only the term
explicitly displayed in eq. (14) is clearly not valid in the case p(0) = 0. In that case,
P SMM(y) = ξy, where ξ = 1/N0y0 is a constant.
In this paper we examined the implications of burnout for the late time behavior
of the single monthly mortality P SMM
N
and the survival factor yN (in the N ’th month).
Our main assumption was that the probability to refinance and the initial distribution
of borrowers are smoothly distributed in a variable, θ, that labels borrowers propensity
to refinance. In the case that the incentive to prepay, and other relevant economic
factors, are constant with time these results are very simple; P SMMN = p
(0) + (1 −
p(0))/N , and yN = yN0(N0/N)(1 − p
(0))(N−N0), where p(0) is a constant. (Here N ,
N0 and N −N0 are assumed large and terms less important for large values of these
quantities are neglected.) The term of order 1/N in P SMM
N
reflects the fact that
burnout causes the prepayment rate to decrease with N and it gives rise to the factor
of N0/N in the expression for yN . The approach of the single monthly mortality
to its limiting value, p(0), is independent of the details of the initial distribution of
borrowers and the θ dependence of the probability of refinancing. We compared our
prediction for P SMMN with results from simulations based on the PIMCO prepayment
model and found reasonable agreement when N is large.
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Plot of CPR in percent versus month. The grey line is the result of a
5
simulation based on the PIMCO prepayment model with a constant 200 bp refinancing
incentive and no turnover. The black line is eq. (9) with the fitted value p(0) =
0.00958.
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